

More Muddles in the Models: Knowledge, the Nation-State and Philippine Social Science

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Modernity and Social Science

The rise of the social sciences in the West during the 19th c. was the result of rapid and unprecedented social changes. These followed the increasing penetration of capitalist relations into the routines of everyday life made possible by advances in communication, transportation and science. Engels' investigations into the conditions of the working class, and the increasing differentiation of society throughout the 19th c. revealed a world no longer certain of its values and direction, and increasingly threatened by the rising demands of its disenfranchised elements. Moreover, the globalization of everyday life caused by an expanding and imperial capitalism brought hitherto alien and exotic cultures into the realm of metropolitan life, while simultaneously disengaging culture from its local base. Henceforth, local elements of cultural life coexisted with their global aspects. This transformation of local experience and its increasing mediation by global forces uncovered the conventional basis of tradition and replaced it with the conditions of modernity. This is why for Giddens (1990:42); "modernity is itself deeply and intrinsically sociological". Moreover, it is also intrinsically anthropological. The global condition has generated an awareness of locality as simply one of a range of possibilities that may be compared with others.

Anthropology and sociology developed out of a crisis in late modernity which the then reigning paradigms in the historical and philosophical sciences were unable to resolve. The new conceptions of time and space made possible by advances in communication and transportation media altered long held views of society. A new understanding of the sphere of the social was required, and since neither history nor philosophy could provide it, a new paradigm arose which was able to link hitherto unconnected areas of life (i.e. state, market and culture).

The notion of a simultaneous present over an arbitrary space made possible by standard time and measures in 1885 (Pertierra, 1997) led to the conception of synchronic structures. The synchronic model was initially drawn from linguistics, where signs are arbitrarily linked to referents. These new paradigms reconstituted time and space as formal constructs linking hitherto disparate areas of life and exposing their conventional nature. The view of society as artifactual and open to increasing structures of rationalization became the established orthodoxy. The rational amenability of social life became the main goal of the modern state and social science was the chief instrument for its attainment. By applying the above understanding and explanation for the emergence of the social sciences in the West,

I intend to test its validity in the Asian context.

The Asian Model

As the process of decolonization was carried out in Asia, native scholars began to view their own societies through local perspectives and indigenous values (Srinivas, 1976; Enriquez, 1990). For anthropology, the exotic had to be made quotidian and for sociology the interests of the state had to be seen to satisfy the requirements of modern nationhood. In both cases, paradigms derived from a western experience seemed inappropriate. One response has been to indigenize the social sciences in the hope of making them more suitable for local needs. This paper examines the attempts to indigenize the social sciences in Asia, focusing on anthropology and sociology. The case of the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore are particularly instructive since these have initially modeled their social sciences on the West but are increasingly exploring other possibilities, following the cultural and administrative requirements of their respective nation-states.

Social Location of Knowledge

A quality of late modernity has been the increasing role of knowledge in managing social affairs. Modern states are converting themselves into knowledge regimes in order to meet the challenges of contemporary governance. Under these conditions, intellectuals play an important role either as providers of knowledge or as facilitators for identifying the growing knowledge-needs of society. Social scientists distinguish themselves from other "experts" or specialists by locating knowledge in its social context, linking it with specific interests and programs. As intellectuals, social scientists see their activity as embedded in social relations and practices. Hence the position of the intellectual, including intellectual production is seen as socially located - intellectuality is not a purely cognitive activity, it is not disembodied knowledge but is instead socially constituted and socially constituting. This knowledge is self-consciously directed towards social change. While there have been other seekers after knowledge (e.g. philosophers and sages) they were not operating within a sociological understanding of action. Society for these earlier thinkers was not sociologically constituted - knowledge was not imbedded in practical activities involving specific social relationships but rather in the disinterested pursuit of truth as an objective-transcendental state achievable through purely meditative- cognitive means.

In contrast to this earlier role of the intellectual, is the late modern understanding of the social scientist that sees society as composed of social actors pursuing distinct goals within a common present-future. Knowledge and its pursuit become simply one of the many social activities with specific properties but sharing with other activities a

common social context. The close link between social science as socially constituted as well as socially constituting, and the global conditions producing it, creates a tension between the particular needs of local knowledge and the universal claims of science.

This paper explores the links between civil society and the state in Asia, and the way in which this relationship is expressed in the practice of social science. I have written about this relationship (Pertierra, 2002), in particular why the nation-state rather than an ethnic, religious or linguistic collectivity is usually the site for a social science practice. The close links between national consciousness and the appreciation of the artifactuality of social, is one primary reason why the nation-state and not an ethnic community (e.g. A Singaporean but not a Balinese sociology) is the usual site for a social science practice. A national consciousness is generally developed in the context of a sovereign will, free to pursue common goals. Other forms of consciousness (e.g. religion, ethnicity, and gender) are often seen as less amenable to reflective manipulation, or lack the basis for the sovereign pursuit of collective goals. Hence, while there are attempts to establish a Catholic, Malay or feminist social science, these often fail, either for lacking an appreciation of their artifactuality or the absence of structures within which claims may be sovereignly pursued. Instead, what a religious, ethnic or gender consciousness can do is point out the interest positions within which existing social science operates, exposing its ideological, ethnic or gender assumptions. Such a critique can thereafter become a basis for reformulating national goals. In the present circumstances, only the nation-state or its alliances exercise formal sovereignty as well as recognize their artifactual constitution.

While the social sciences are closely linked to modern state structures, they are not totally subservient to the needs of the state. In fact, they act as a counterpoint between the state and the society that encompasses it. For this reason, however important questions of policy may be, the social sciences cannot be limited to offering policy advice. To do so would pervert their other equally important function, which is to express the needs of civil society and extramural understanding. The social sciences must balance their administrative and policy functions with their emancipatory role. They must point out the constraints within which all discourse on policy operates so as to offer alternative views of social needs and the social good. Social science must ask questions outside the narrow interests of the nation-state to express wider societal needs both within and outside its jurisdiction.

Social Science and a Sovereign Will

The cadastralization of space and the chronometrization of time achieved by the modern state during the last decades of the 19th c. enabled an increasing division of labor that produced a consciousness of difference requiring rational forms of resolution. A nation-state with sovereignty over an arbitrary but defined territory, and acknowledging other sovereign communities, provided the initial impetus for the

development of the social sciences. Other forms of collective life, based either on locality or ethnicity, and drawing on notions of primordiality, with their uncontested clauses, have proved to be less suitable bases for the rational amenability of social life. This rational amenability is the ultimate goal of social science. For this reason, there are attempts to create a Singaporean social science but not a Balinese one, since the latter sees itself as embedded in a substantive consciousness that is unable to raise the question of conscious self-constitution. To do so would challenge Indonesia's undisputed sovereignty over the island.

Similarly, while Filipinos seek to develop an indigenous social science, they do so only at the level of the nation. The quest for a Filipino psychology (*Sikolohiyang Pilipino*) is not echoed in demands for an Ifugao one. What both the Balinese and the Ifugao can aspire for is a muted version of sovereignty under the guise of traditional or native rights. Thus, while they may not determine their political futures they can at least preserve their original identities. They have a right to their pasts but the future belongs to the nation-state.

For the same reason, while Australian Aborigines are slowly having their dignity as a people recognized, they are unlikely to achieve autonomy except as part of a wider Australian society. In this context, one can appreciate why Aboriginal activists are increasingly impatient with anthropological accounts of their societies since these accounts do not always provide the basis for their political claims. The conditions for the production of anthropological knowledge arise out of wider societal and indeed global interests that generally argue against essentialist claims. Oppressed minorities are often obliged to resort to essentialist grounds for their claims since the recognition of difference is accepted and even protested by the state.

The Construction of a National Identity

The problem of identity, which is currently a debated topic in Australia and Asia, draws on notions of uniqueness and primordiality. The West often stresses the former at the cost of the latter, while Asia is accused of the opposite. These approaches are generally misunderstood as pitting individualism versus collectivism or democracy versus authoritarianism, whereas they more accurately reflect different attitudes to the increasing realization of the conventionality of everyday life brought about by a global capitalism. Instead of these oppositions between West and non-West, the notion of hybridity is a more appropriate recognition of what is increasingly inevitable.

The study of national traditions in social science can explore the consequences caused by an awareness of the artifactual nature of the social so as to increase reflective amenability, while ensuring ontological security by anchoring reflection within the human condition. Thus, in Australia, one can contrast indigenous notions of Aboriginality

stressing a substantive ontology with the non-substantive concept of an Australian character open to the full plenitude of past and future multiculturalisms. While the former is utilizing past conventions to define the present, the latter claims the present through a sovereign future made explicit in attempts such as The Australian National University's project - *Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001*. At recent conferences of the Australian Anthropological Association, Aboriginal participants often questioned the relevance of conventional anthropology for their specific needs. While indigenous peoples may romanticize the past to defend the present, others secure it through their tenure on the future. In both cases, social science is rejected or employed, often without an adequate understanding of similar situations in Asia. Conceptions of citizenship which are currently being raised in Australia in anticipation of its new role in Asia, particularly in the context of the so-called East-West values clash, would profit from a better understanding of the links between the political needs of a nation-state and the practice of social science.

The Borderlands of Society and Culture

The self-understanding of a nation or a people as a culturally homogeneous entity provided the model for a distinct sphere of the social. To this was added the notion that such a cultural entity was spatio-temporally delimited, resulting in the modern nation-state as a form of historico-cultural territorialization. Such a nation-state exercises sovereign rights within its territories. It is composed of an active citizenry consciously pursuing its goals and determinedly defending its freedom. Social science is an expression of this consciousness in response to society's knowledge needs. However, as mentioned earlier, it would be a mistake to conflate the interests of the state with those of social science. The nation-state is as much an invention of the social sciences as it is their cause. Even as social science requires the resources of the modern nation-state for its teaching and research needs, it is equally dependent on a vigorous civil culture distinct from the state, lest the state conflate its interests with society at large. Society is the ultimate source for the state's legitimacy even as the state suborns the ideology of nationhood to replace civil society. Society arises out of a sense of community of which the nation and its attendant state are but one albeit major aspect. While the modern state is increasingly able to shape structures of consciousness and to control many aspects of everyday life, it does not exhaust all the sources of collective experience. Other forms of association and social effervescence, both local and global (e.g. social movements), remain outside the formal structures of the state, providing it with the values and symbols necessary for its reproduction and legitimization.

In the present global condition, the nation-state may no longer be the primary site for the source of representations. As a consequence, the boundaries between cultures and societies have become porous as center and periphery are increasingly intertwined. Under these conditions, identity no longer represents spatio-temporally-based

cores but rather intersections of experience involving a network of acentric nodes communicating simultaneously. In a postmodern world, the global condition is experienced in plural localities such as Paris, New York and Tokyo as well as Dubai, Kabul and Manila. These acentric nodes nurture their own local identities while interposing the cultural boundaries of a global order. Sites of cultural production and consumption are no longer spatially nor temporally distinguished, creating difficulties for the maintenance of earlier canonical standards. The condition that Rosaldo (1989) refers to as "borderland hysteria", involves the collocation of heterogeneous spatio-temporal modes - the past co-exists with the present and the global with the local.

In contradistinction to late modernity, the contemporary condition interposes localities and identities, leading to the de-territorialization of cultures as well as to their autonomization (Appadurai, 1990). This earlier decontextualization of culture from its sources in lived experience which had led to its awareness as artifactual, now encourages a view of it as autopoietic and self-referential. No longer grounded in a local routine of everyday life with its corresponding set of collective images, culture increasingly becomes merely representation or the domain of signifying practices rather than an arena of practical significations. An awareness of culture's artifactuality has led to its separation from other practical conventions into a realm of its own. Under these conditions, culture is no longer collectively shared but only synchronically networked. It becomes almost a personal quest rather than a communal affair. The expression of such a diasporal and subjective identity is manifested in the rise of new forms of ethnicities, often separated from corresponding forms of life. This is indicated in the shift as Anderson (1992) points out from Irish-American to Irish-American.

The Functionalization of the Social in late Modernity

The cadastralization of space and the chronometrization of time eliminated the autonomy of the local, transforming locality into a set of spatio-temporal coordinates. Cartesian space-time assumes the homogeneous nature of extension and duration such that any points in the system of coordinates can be expressed as a value of a given function. Such a functionalization, under the conditions of modernity, is able to link individuals or practices throughout the system by defining their appropriate boundary conditions. A nation-state is a collectivity whose members share a functional relationship ensuring a simultaneous present and a commonly anticipated future (Heller, 1990). Any point on this set of coordinates is functionally linked to other points through the boundary conditions of simultaneous membership in the nation-state.

Earlier states or dynastic realms, as Anderson (1983) refers to them, could not be plotted on the same set of coordinates since their members were not linked to a shared set of spatio-temporal projects

but instead were hierarchically associated through diverse and idiosyncratic orders. They were stratified rather than functionally differentiated. While such diversity often lived contiguously and even shared the same time-space, this was achieved through an accommodation of their differences rather than, as in the modern case, through their rational negotiation. These differences in pre-modernity could not be rationally negotiated because they involved the distinct value-complexes of groups rather than the interest positions of individuals.

The temporal character of late modernity is a sense of simultaneous presentness (Heller, 1990). Society is an association of individuals coordinating their actions to this simultaneous present. This short-lived reality is destabilizing for a sense of identity. Hence, modernity looks to a stabilizing future, to which nationalists often add an eternal past. Another feature of modernity is the crucial role of knowledge for the expression, maintenance and reproduction of power. Knowledge represents a form of power in all societies but for modernity, certain modes of power can only be expressed through its relationship with knowledge. While I am drawing attention to the close links between knowledge and power under the conditions of modernity and as expressed in the social sciences, I am not claiming that knowledge is only or primarily a relationship of power. Rather that power requires new forms of knowledge for its reproduction in modern society.

Social science is a form of knowledge required for the practical reproduction of modernity. By contrast, non-modern societies do not have to have social science as a form of self-knowledge. For them, religion, philosophy and other modes of knowing constitute sufficient forms of understanding to ensure social and cultural reproduction. Luhmann (1982) and Heller (1990) have argued that modes of self-understanding are associated with the structures that make up society. Hence traditional or stratified societies have a mode of self-understanding different from that found in functionally organized ones.

This new relationship between power and knowledge under conditions of modernity poses particular questions regarding the basis for reaching an understanding. For modernity, knowledge is often limited to forms of understanding involving instrumentally defined relationships with an objectified world. Empiricism and pragmatism represent canonical knowledge used by the state to organize society. Other forms of knowledge are seen as subjective, non-cumulative or as mere beliefs (e.g. religion, folklore).

Since much of modern knowledge is limited to instrumental-strategic modes, Weber's fears about the iron cage are well founded. While Habermas (1989) attempts to overcome this restriction by including dialogic communication as a basis for reaching understanding, he is less clear about the conditions that make such a communication not only rationally possible but also practically feasible. In a society where subjective experience is not directly but only mediately linked to a mode of life (e.g. the fragmentation of social life, the autonomization of representations), the basis for an intersubjectivity that Habermas requires for dialogic communication is

not guaranteed. Ego and alter, as distinct subjects cannot assume a common cultural basis for consensual agreement other than through interest positions. But it is common values and not only interest positions that generate the possibilities for consensus. Such common values cannot arise in functionally organized societies directly out of interest positions. The purpose of functionally organized societies is to enable the rational resolution of differences by subjects engaged in distinct projects defined within a shared simultaneity. This functional engagement dispenses with values in favor of interest positions since the former is group-based and diachronic while the latter are particular and synchronic.

Conceptions of the universal basis of understanding

Whilst the needs of the modern nation-state required new forms of knowledge provided by the social sciences, the latter are also a product of a critical tradition dating back to their classical roots, maintained during the Renaissance and encouraged by the Enlightenment. This tradition distances itself from the narrow and strategic needs of the state in order to build links across political communities as well as within them. It seeks a ground for consensus outside the formal structures of the political order and instead bases the possibilities of agreement on universal conditions of understanding. Thus, medieval universities were always extra-local institutions seeking to build a community of scholars not totally beholden to parochial interests but to the universal pursuit of truth (Swanson, 1979). In other words, medieval scholars sought the basis for consensual agreement beyond narrow political boundaries. They developed the basis for resolving disputes *via concil* rather through the earlier *via facti*. This wider understanding was initially provided by the common and universal acceptance of a Christian dominion. From the times of their establishment, universities such as Paris, Oxford, Salamanca, Bologna and Leipzig issued judgements accepted as valid beyond their local boundaries (*sub specie aeternitatis*). As part of their functions, these universities deliberately cultivated a universal perspective detached from the immediate and narrow demands of local and even national administrators.

Another source for a critical perspective came from civil society itself, in areas outside the formal structures of the state. Under the conditions of modernity, civil life was reconstituted as the sphere of sociality encompassed by the nation, in which the state has a directing role. Whereas the state expresses a structure of practical action, the nation represents a moral and ideal community that provides the state with its legitimacy.

However, as indicated earlier, the modern state attempts to create a homogeneous culture throughout its domain to facilitate governmentality. For this task, social science is the state's chief instrument and under these conditions culture is reduced to the

domain of representation. Such a conception of a national culture facilitates its colonization by the state. In this view, culture no longer becomes a contingent reality achieved through the countless negotiations of everyday life but instead is seen as a transcendent and canonical reality congruent with and imposed by the state. However, even late modernity has not achieved such a total colonization of society. Significant forms of social effervescence remain outside the state's formal control. Moreover, in the postmodern condition, the state, society and culture have indeterminate and porous boundaries. These indeterminate structures enable perspectives outside their respective totalizing gaze. Postmodern critiques draw on such drifting perspectives but often fail to consider the objective conditions for their possibility.

For the reasons above, social scientists should carefully distinguish their obligations to the nation-state from the broader concerns that are equally responsible for their knowledge. In fact, it is the knowledge of the conditions of its own production that requires social science to look beyond the nation-state. It should act as a bridge linking the state with the societies and cultures that encompass it.

Sovereignty and the Nation-State

So far I have argued that the social sciences have close but also divergent links with the modern nation-state. This closeness arises out of the knowledge requirements of modern governance as well as the ability of the state to provide the social sciences with the material and social structures for their development. The divergence is a result of the fact that social science also expresses wider socio-cultural interests, whether this be defined locally, nationally or globally.

Correspondingly, while Filipinos seek to develop an indigenous social science they do so only at the level of the nation. Localities and ethnicities may preserve their pasts but they cannot determine their future. The determination of the future lies at the level of the nation-state, which as stated earlier consists of a collectivity whose members share a consciously simultaneous present-future and not necessarily a common past (an impossibility for migrant-based societies such as Singapore or Australia). In this sense, the contemporary consciousness of a diasporic ethnicity is an expression of deterritorialized primordiality within the private and subjective sphere. Such ethnicities are not linked to a collective life-mode but to a synchronized presentness linking distinct subjects through their common primordiality. Such a synchronic but diasporic consciousness indicates that the contemporary condition can give rise to forms of collective representations not incorporated within the nation-state and even challenging its demands for exclusive allegiance (Appadurai, 1996).

I have argued that the notion of self-determination or sovereignty, at least at the collective level, is an essential (though not a sufficient) basis for the practice of the social sciences (e.g. Greek city-states were sovereign but failed to see themselves as fully artifactual).

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the nation-state constituted the basis for a view of sovereignty. In the 20th century, the notion of universal rights began replacing the nation-state's prerogative for self-constitution. Universal rights are placed above the cultural sovereignty of nation-states in favor of an even higher collectivity. Social science can contribute to this process by recalling how a cultural identity, whether at the level of the local community, the nation or a universal forum is a negotiated process where ego and alter recognize a common basis for consensual understanding. Traumatic events such as 11 September 2001 may hasten this process of consensual understanding and replace it with new coercive structures.

The close links which social science has with the nation-state were forged at a time when nation-states were themselves engaged in establishing a new international order. Colonialism and later imperialism required that the main Western powers reach an understanding for an efficient exploitation of their territories. The global economy required the increasing coordination of trans-national regions of production, exchange and consumption. This required a basis of consensus beyond the nation and was once more provided by the transnational community of scholars that had earlier formed the *respublica literatorum* but was now reconstituted under the banner of a universal science. Standard time zones and universal units of measurements supplemented the establishment during the late 19th century of the gold standard as the global medium of exchange. These not only ensured the basis for expanding the possibilities of sharing a simultaneous present and predictable futures but also encouraged a rational negotiation of difference, initially only among the colonizers but eventually encompassing the colonized. The implications of imperialism for anthropology are only lately being realized (Asad, 1973; Clifford & Marcus, 1986).

The Conditions for a Philippine Social Science

So far I have discussed the most general conditions for the possibility of a social science. What were the conditions of life that led to their establishment in the Philippines? One major prerequisite was the politico-administrative needs of the modern state. To create and maintain a modern political order requires new forms of knowledge, staatswissenschaft (e.g. social statistics, demography, penology, public health, economics, psychology, sociology, and anthropology). In the case of the last two, the metropolis emphasizes sociology while the colonies require anthropology.

Towards the end of the 19th century studies began to appear in the Philippines written by Spaniards and Filipinos dealing with social problems which required a modern and scientific understanding. The new interest in areas such as criminality, social policy and public health represented new modes of governmentality. This transformation of traditional modes of domination required the

functionalization of knowledge. The school was slowly replacing the supervisory and socializing role of the Church. These studies increased during the American period (1896-1946) and included anthropological investigations of non-Christian tribes.

The modern problem of governance required scientific knowledge provided by the social sciences. In the process, other forms of social consciousness were reduced to a non-scientific status such as folklore and popular culture, or anthropologized as ethnography. The growing specialization of knowledge encouraged by a scientific orientation replaced hitherto valued approach used by indigenous healers, community elders and other representatives of traditional society. This latter tradition was preserved in areas of life untouched by the modernizing state and later re-discovered under the category of local or folkloric knowledge.

By the end of the 19th century, several decades after the opening of Philippine ports to international trade, the country was slowly emerging out of its religio-colonial past. The generation of *ilustrados*, greatly influenced by developments in Europe was keen to translate these trends into the Philippines but were prevented from doing so by the recalcitrant opposition of both Church and State. Nevertheless, the *ilustrados* were laying the basis for a national culture consciously different from its metropolitan source.

As early as 1889 Rizal proposed the study of the Philippines as a distinct object of investigation, to his German friend Blumentritt (Salazar, 1990). Rizal envisioned this activity not only as the study of the Philippines whether by Filipinos or foreigners but also as a constitutive activity resulting in a distinct Filipino perspective. This Filipino perspective could be used, in turn, to examine the ways in which foreigners constitute the Philippines as their object of study. Rizal realized that under the prevailing conditions, only a study of the Philippines was possible, and this mainly from the perspective of the non-Filipino.

That the political and social conditions both in Europe and the Philippines allowing for such an exchange of perspectives did not then exist was clearer to Rizal than to his European colleagues. In fact, from their perspective, his European colleagues could not fully appreciate Rizal's position. For Rizal, Philippine Studies represents as well as constitutes a perspective of Filipino experience. This experience cannot be fully understood until Filipinos themselves become active agents in its definition - impossible under the conditions of coloniality.

In other words, a sociological practice is an aspect of a consciousness of agency that deliberately constitutes society. While the *ilustrados* were laying the cultural foundation for this Filipino perspective, international factors (Spanish-American war) once more intervened, resulting in a major social disruption which prevented its completion. Lacking such a national cultural foundation of agency, Philippine Studies as advocated by Rizal and exemplified in the social sciences were aborted.

Instead of arising out of a modern appreciation of its own self-constitution, the initial impetus for social science in the Philippines

developed out of the administrative needs of the American colonial regime. The University of the Philippines became the model for the modern nexus between knowledge and the requirements of democratic governance. Where earlier tertiary institutions such as the Universidad de Santo Tomas were dominated by the needs of clerical exegesis, the University of the Philippines represented the empirical search for rational principles of social life. Anthropology, sociology and political science were early components of the new university's structure, and while initially headed by Americans soon began training Filipinos in these disciplines. Although most of these Filipino pioneers in social science seldom questioned the appropriateness of their Western training, the local needs of a colonial nation-state shaped their interests. Despite the reigning positivism characterizing American social science, both Americans and Filipinos eventually realized the inadequateness of much metropolitan social theory and practice in the Philippine context (Weightman, 1985). Political independence sharpened these perceptions and conscious attempts were made to satisfy the requirements of an emerging national consciousness.

In 1957 Catapusan was complaining that while sociology existed in the Philippines there was as yet no Philippine sociology. In other words, while empirical studies of Philippine society existed, such studies did not proceed from a national perspective. Nearly three decades later and a century after Rizal, David (1984:72) finally proclaimed the existence of a Philippine sociology. "We have at last begun to appropriate the discipline, to use it rather than to be used by it, and to extend its boundaries far beyond the parameters set by Hunt and Collier's sociology".

This pronouncement had been preceded a few years earlier by a similar one for psychology (*Sikolohiyang Pilipino*; Enriquez, 1990) and in a related vein, Agpalo (1981) was advocating an indigenous model for Filipino politics. It seemed that Rizal's vision of a distinctive Filipino perspective had finally arrived. However, the period of late modernity that had framed Rizal's ideas had in the intervening time been replaced by the conditions of postmodernity. The basis for a Philippine perspective that Rizal's generation might have negotiated no longer existed. Modern communication, mass migration and transnational production have created a condition of cultural dislocation, where national boundaries are no longer the principal constituents of a collective consciousness.

The aspirations of a distinctive Filipino social science have, on the whole, not been achieved despite the real gains in empirical research. What is needed is a new theorization of the conditions for a social science practice in the present conjuncture. Global modernity and complex connectivity link local practice to their sources beyond the nation and the region. The diasporization of intellectual and cultural life require corresponding frameworks for understanding social science practice.

Social Science and rational amenability

In the preceding sections I have argued that social science, particularly sociology and anthropology developed out of a crisis of governance produced by the conditions of late modernity. An increasing awareness of the global condition and its determination of the routines of everyday life characterize this period. Modern capitalism and the industrial revolution severed the traditional and hierarchic basis of western society, threatening its viability through an increasingly bitter class struggle. The ideology of nationalism and an increase in the state's administrative apparatus, including a more efficient re-distributive mechanism, prevented the dissolution of modern society. Instead this crisis resulted in the artistic, technological and intellectual accomplishments of late modernity, which surpassed the achievements even of the Renaissance period.

Giddens (1990) is correct in associating late modernity with a sociological perspective, to which I would add anthropology with its appreciation of the centrality of the Other for the Self. With the decline of religion, late modernity seeks the corrigibility of social life through rational and instrumental actions. The state takes this role upon itself, acting as the motor for social improvement, having in the meantime reduced society to the Gallic concept of the nation. This approach, while common, has not been completely successful.

The reason for its failure lies in the original cause for a social science consciousness. The growing realization of the conventional basis of social life arose out of the global condition, where difference has to be negotiated as an on-going aspect of everyday life. The formal structures of the state do not allow for the full range of negotiating possibilities that are encountered in society, hence the increasing tension between the state and civil society. The latter is culturally fragmented and hence is unable to provide a homogeneous base for interaction, particularly in areas affected by global factors. While both the state and society attempt to localize the global condition, in this process local culture is globalized. As a result, representations are disembedded from their sources in lived experience and no longer collectively shared but instead synchronically networked.

Anderson (1992) refers to radical political actions under these conditions as a revolution by fax, to which we can add CNN, mobile phones and the internet. These technologies not only allow for instant communication and interaction but also constitute a set of hyperreal images that have displaced an earlier, more concretely based world. The new world of virtual reality allows for an intersubjectivity of synchronic images leading to hitherto unimagined and radical possibilities. Postcorporeal subjects enter into virtual relationships, replacing an earlier reality with hyperreality. New technologies of desire arise to meet the new possibilities. A texting manual advises its readers:

You are under my spell!
You will do as I command
Pindot, Pindot, Pindot

Ha, ha, ha. It works. *Ngayon naman*
Hubad, Hubad.

Conclusion

Social science developed as a form of self-understanding in functionally differentiated societies during the period of late modernity. The separation of the sphere of values and their progressive rationalization disembedded actions from their traditional routines, exposing their conventional nature. In this process, the basis for agreement shifted from one of common values to interest positions. The standardization of space-time during the 1880's facilitated this conventional view. Society was henceforth seen as a synchronic entity, all of whose members being connected to one another not through sharing a set of transcendental values but rather by sharing interest positions within a common present as well as a commonly anticipated future. This is expressed in the notion of a sovereign nation-state, whose members are engaged in distinct and even incommensurable projects but all are linked through a simultaneous and functional present.

Using the metaphor of the individual, the modern state projects an image of itself as a functional-organic unity. Nationalism employs this projection in its attempts to create cultural homogeneity. For nationalists, the state is not primarily a structure of practical actions but more importantly a guarantor of ontological principles which locate subscribers within their existential realities (Kapferer, 1989). The state becomes the defender of the nation, whose qualities have been defined *a priori*. In these conditions, rather than a national culture arising out of common practices, it instead determines them. From a system of practical significations, a national culture becomes the domain of canonically signifying practices enforced by the state on subjects operating within a shared simultaneity.

The modern state invents the nation as its cultural expression and the social sciences assist in constituting and reproducing both. The administrative needs of the nation-state require new forms of knowledge for the normalization of subjects whose interest positions arise out of incommensurable projects. However, social science also arises out of the need of civil society to seek universal conditions for reaching an understanding. From this perspective, social science must criticize the narrow interests of the state as well as the cultural composition of the nation. It can begin by showing the practical and contingent basis of the state's interests as well as the fragmentary and conflictive nature of cultural orientations. Collective experience is not exhausted by the state nor is it reflected in the nation even if both have come to dominate the structures of everyday life. The state's requirement for practical agreement is dependent on society's values, and these values draw on distinct cultural orders brought about by local and global conditions. For these reasons, social science must

identify the shifting and porous boundaries linking the state, society and culture pointing out their regularities and discontinuities.

Social science is as much a mode of self-understanding brought about by the conditions of modernity as it is a response to contemporary *aporias*. Culture and society have to be imagined and constituted in particular ways before they can be scientifically investigated. In the process of their study, culture and society are themselves constituted according to the rational and objectivistic requirements of a scientific practice. This doubly constitutive hermeneutic must be kept in mind lest we become entrapped through the study of our own practices or in the case of anthropology, lest we entrap others in the same process.

For this reason, Heller (1990) insists that under the conditions of modernity, sociology and philosophy are indispensable modes for understanding society. While philosophy provides the most general propositions about society, sociology is required to obtain the specific knowledge for generalization. In the absence of a commonly shared life-world, social knowledge has to be obtained empirically rather than intuitively. The functional constitution of modern society prevents its members from understanding it intuitively. Members can only appreciate their own functional positions. Sociologists are partly able to transcend this constraint by collecting data from diverse sectors and by constructing theoretical models.

Despite Rizal's attempts, the absence of a national culture in the 19th century prevented the development of a Philippine social science. Such a social science would have assumed the capacity of Filipinos for conscious self-constitution, difficult under the conditions of coloniality. Instead, the Philippines could only be an object of study and this mainly from the perspective of an outsider. Since the Philippines could not have a perspective for itself, the possibility of developing a social science became unlikely. However, other perspectives were available to Rizal and he made good use of them.

Nevertheless, Rizal's generation was laying the basis for a Filipino perspective arising from three centuries of Spanish colonization. This emerging national culture resulted in the production of canonical texts of which Rizal's novels, Luna's paintings and the social research of de los Reyes and Pardo de Tavera are the best known. This expatriate group of *ilustrados* had drawn on the earlier experiences of Filipinos such as Burgos who, a generation before had begun to express a national perspective. During the middle of the 19th century, Burgos and others of his generation were starting to separate their religious commitments from their political destinies. Following the economic changes of the 19th century, Filipinos perceived themselves as political actors with their own agendas separate from their Spanish colonizers, despite sharing with them a common language and religion. The first glimmer of a secularist perspective with its separation of spheres of value was slowly taking root in the Philippines. But fate had decreed otherwise and, following the imposition of American rule, this slowly forming Hispanic-influenced but Filipino national perspective was shattered. It would take nearly another century before Filipinos confidently proclaimed their own

social science perspective.

Only after the Americans had introduced universal schooling during the early part of the 20th century, together with a view of society as rationally amenable, was it possible for social science to establish itself. Social science was initially an administrative tool for the American project of modernization but later became a distinct perspective within which to interrogate its own projects of social constitution in a post-colonial period. Indigenization is an attempt to formalize this distinct perspective but its insistence on using the nation as its referent limits its usefulness. In the present global condition, the nation-state is no longer the major site for identity-formation even if it still represents the formal site of sovereignty. Philippine social science attempts to exercise this sovereignty by imagining the nation through indigenous concepts. In the process, it essentializes Filipinohood as well as reduces the multiple differences found within civil society. Instead, a Filipino social science could explore this rich source of difference and show how it is not resolved within the contingent and narrow interests of the state or of the nation as presently imagined. Social science could investigate the ways in which society and culture are processes resulting from practical interests arising out of an ideal but unachieved conception of the universal basis for reaching an understanding.

A Philippine social science is a discourse as well as a practice that partly creates its object of investigation. The distinctiveness of such a discourse defines the qualities that constitute Filipinos, marking them off from others. As Ray (1990) argues for India, such a discourse is also part of a European analytic and is therefore doubly constitutive. Indigenization may be an attempt to influence such an analytic but it does not overcome its roots within a Western problematic. Just as a subaltern history can only represent a subaltern subject, an indigenous social science leaves unaltered the master European narrative that categorizes it as indigenous. Rather than simply assist in this Western project of understanding others from their own perspectives, a Philippine social science should return to a basic humanism. It should investigate how society and culture are projects - often conflictive, contingent and never completed - resulting from practical interests in achieving a universal basis for reaching an understanding. In this sense a Filipino experience is as fundamental as any other, and the European narrative is simply one decisive moment of a common dialogue.

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